Now the security-fix releases are behind us, let's briefly talk about the ramifications.
The recent Git/Hg vulnerability on case-insensitive or normalizing filesystems are serious for people who fetch and integrate (either pull or pull --rebase) from untrusted sources.
When you grab a tree that records a malicious path, say, ".Git/hooks/post-checkout" using an older version of Git on such a filesystem (e.g. Windows NTFS or Mac OS X HFS+), Git will tell the filesystem to check it out at ".Git/hooks/post-checkout", but the filesystem overwrites a file different from what Git asked it to write, namely ".git/hooks/post-checkout", which is a path reserved for you to store an executable hook that is run after running "git checkout".
For an attacker to victimize you through this vector, the attacker has to have a write access to a repository you pull from. As long as you do not interact with untrustworthy strangers (e.g. only pull from the projects' official history), you will not be affected. That is often true in corporate setting, where the access to the central repository everybody in the product group uses is tightly controlled, and if an untrustworthy stranger has a write access there, you already have a bigger problem.
But the open-source is all about collaboration, and we need to meet and interact with new people every day while doing so. The prudent thing to do is to (1) update to the version of Git recently released to work around this issue, and then (2) respond to a pull request from a stranger, in this order. Don't do it the other way around!